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Exporting the Rule of Law
John V. Orth'

The Rule of Law is routinely prescribed these days for what
ails the post-Communist world.' The new democracies of Central
and Eastern Europe, particularly Russia, are advised to develop a
stable property regime, a reliable means of contract enforcement,

and an impartial judiciary. The market economies of East Asia,
particularly China, are urged to implement the Rule of Law in the
civil and political rights area as well as in the economic domain.2
Failure to adopt the Rule of Law will be punished, it is said, not
only by the discipline of the market but also by international,
political, and economic sanctions.
From the law and legal history point of view, these policy
prescriptions, however well-intentioned, risk sounding banal,
naive, or both. The achievement of the Rule of Law in Western
Europe and North America came at a great cost, involving wars
and revolutions, and took place over centuries and decades, not
months and weeks.' Furthermore, modem lawyers have difficulty
assigning the Rule of Law operational meaning outside the
William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. A.B. 1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. 1977, Harvard
University.
' See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
1998, at 95; Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 22.
2 See, e.g., Elizabeth Rosenthal, Ideas for Legal Reform to Be Explored, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1998, at A8 (describing "a 'rule of law' initiative" offering "Chinese
scholars and officials American expertise as Beijing pursues ongoing legal reforms").
3 See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 24-26 (Greek
perception of the Rule of Law), 69-70 (Roman concept of Rule of Law), 99-100 (the
Rule of Law in the Early Middle Ages), 131-34 (the Rule of Law in the High Middle
Ages), 176-79 (the Rule of Law in the Renaissance and the Reformation), 232-36 (the
Rule of Law in the seventeenth century), 282-83 (the Rule of Law in the eighteenth
century), 409-13 (the Rule of Law in the twentieth century) (1992); A.V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 179-201 (7th ed. 1908)
(the Rule of Law in England).
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specific norms and institutions of a given jurisdiction. A few
lawyers, mainly academic, have come to question the possibility,
even the desirability, of the Rule of Law.4 Finally, theorists who
emphasize the role of civilizations in shaping world order suggest
that the Rule of Law is uniquely Western and that it may not be
"for export.'' 5
I. The Concept of the Rule of Law
Although the general idea of a rule-based state is as old as the
Romans, the specific phrase "the Rule of Law" was first
popularized only in the last half of the nineteenth century by A.V.
Dicey, Vinerian Professor of English law at Oxford from 1882 to
1909.6 In the first edition of his immensely influential and often
reprinted Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,
Dicey confidently declared: "Two features have at all times since
the Norman Conquest characterised the political institutions of
England."7
The first of these venerable features was the
supremacy of the central government.8
Since 1688, that
9
supremacy rested with Parliament. The second feature, "closely
connected with the first," was the Rule of Law.'° As Dicey defined
it, the Rule of Law had three meanings in England: (1) no one
can be made to suffer punishment or to pay damages for any
conduct not definitely forbidden by law;' 1 (2) everyone's legal

'

See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.

5 See, e.g.,

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON,

REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
6 See

RICHARD

A.

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE

68-72 (1996).

COSGROVE,

THE RULE OF LAW:

ALBERT VENN

DICEY,

(1980), reviewed by John V. Orth, On the Relation Between the Rule
of Law and Public Opinion, 80 MICH. L. REV. 753 (1982).
VICTORIAN JURIST

7 DICEY, supra note 3, at 179; see also H.W. Arndt, The Origin of Dicey's
Concept of the "Rule of Law," 31 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 117 (1957) (tracing the concept to
the Australian lawyer W.E. Hearn); Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare
State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 149 (1958) ("In Anglo-American legal philosophy at
least, 'the rule of law' is forever associated with Dicey .... ); see COSGROVE, supra
note 6.
8 See DICEY, supra note 3, at 179.

9 See id.
o Id.
See id. at 183.
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rights and liabilities are determined by the ordinary courts of the
realm;' 2 and (3) everyone's individual rights are derived from the
ordinary law of the land, not from a written constitution, so that
the English Constitution is the product of the ordinary functioning
of the courts and not the source of the courts' jurisdiction.
Dicey's formulation was highly specific. The Rule of Law
was not a cultural attribute common to the West, but rather it was
local to England, a distinctive product of English history and legal
institutions. Dicey's Rule of Law distinguished the English legal
system from the French across the English Channel, where droit
administratif meant separate laws and courts for government
officials, as well as from the Americans across the Atlantic Ocean,
where written state and federal constitutions reigned supreme.14
More than a mere defining national characteristic, the concept
of the Rule of Law also had political uses: as a limitation on
parliamentary supremacy or at least a standard by which to
evaluate the exercise of that supremacy. By the time Dicey
published The Law of the Constitution' in the late nineteenth
century, the English Reform Acts had placed control of Parliament
in hands he could not trust.' 6 In particular, he feared the rising
power of the trade unions and later, specifically, deployed his
constitutional concept against the Trade Disputes Act of 1906.'"
The Act exempted labor organizations from liability in tort, to
which Dicey remarked: "An enactment which frees trade unions
from the rule of equal law stimulates among workmen the fatal
delusion that workmen should aim at the attainment, not of
equality, but of privilege."' 8 Implicitly, Dicey was adding the
12

See id. at 189.

'3 See

id. at 191.

"4 See id. at 324-401 (comparing Rule of Law with droit administratif) and 140-42
(contrasting the unwritten English Constitution with the written federal constitution).
15 DICEY, supra note 3.
16England's First Reform Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 45, extended the right to
vote to middle-class males, and the Second Reform Act (The Representation of the
People Act), 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 102, greatly enlarged the electorate by extending
the vote to working-class males.

1 6 Edw. 7, ch. 47.
18 A.V. DICEY, LECTURES ON

THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN

ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY xlvii

(2d ed. 1914).
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requirement of uniformity to his earlier definition of the Rule of
Law: Everyone's legal rights and liabilities ought to be the same.
The assertion that aspirations of the working class were
antithetical to the ideal of the Rule of Law became commonplace
in English academic legal circles. Sir William Holdsworth, one of
Dicey's successors as Vinerian Professor and author of a multivolume history of English law, repeated the charge in the 1920s:
"It is not till these last days that Parliament itself has allowed
exemptions from the rule of law in favour of the supposed
indefeasible rights of turbulent Trades Unions, conscientious
churchmen, and conscientious objectors, to the great detriment of
the peace and stability of the state."' 9 Similarly, years later in
1980, The Oxford Companion to Law flatly stated: "The rule of
law does not apply in modem Britain which, despite the forms and
some appearances of liberal democracy, when a Labour
government is in power, is a dictatorship headed by a group of
trade union leaders and their political servants."2 ° The general
acceptance of this charge may have contributed to the Labour
Party's repeated electoral losses, until, of course, Tony Blair's
recent creation of New Labour.
In America today, the Rule of Law lacks even the meager
definition supplied by Dicey and is invoked most often for purely
hortatory purposes, as in "ours is a government of laws, not of
men."'" A written constitution supplies more specific guarantees,
making recourse to general principles less necessary. That point
was expressly made in a colloquy between two U.S. Supreme
Court Justices as early as 1798.22 Justice Samuel Chase grandly
declared: "An Act of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law)
contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot

19 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446 (3d ed. 1923).
20 DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW

1094 (1980).

106 (1977) (dismissing the
Rule of Law as used in America in the 1950s as one of several "cheerfully meaningless
slogans"). Recently, an attempt has been made to raise the level of American discourse.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997).
22 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
21 See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW
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be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. 23 Justice
James Iredell, in reply, denied that judges can be guided by so
uncertain a rule: "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no
fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon
the subject ...

,24

As Iredell foresaw, the existence of a written constitution led
to a judicial approach to constitutional decision-making in
America that routinely began with the text, a supposedly "fixed
' rather than with "great first principles. 26 However,
standard, 25
the inclusion in the text of another vague English legal phrase,
"due process of law," meant that the judges were eventually able
to apply many natural law principles, as well as some of their own
personal predilections. 27 Today's due process jurisprudence,
although supposedly based on a constitutional text applicable only
to America, and partly expressed in terms specific to American
legal institutions, resembles to a degree Dicey's Rule of Law. 28
Inherent in both American and English constitutionalism is the
view that even legitimate power is dangerous. In other words,
"power corrupts."29 "The great difficulty," as James Madison

23

Id.

24

Id. at 399.

25

Id.

26 Id. at 388; supra note 23 and accompanying text.
27 In form, the Supreme Court has adopted the views of Justice Iredell and

ruled that it only may invalidate acts of the legislative and executive branches
of the federal and state governments on the basis of specific provisions of the
Constitution. In substance, however, the beliefs of Justice Chase have prevailed
as the Court continually had expanded its basis for reviewing the acts of other
branches of government.
JOHN

E. NOWAK

ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

426 (2d ed. 1983).

28 See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA.

L. REV. 493 (1997) (demonstrating that due process jurisprudence is not directly tied to
the text of the Constitution).
29 The phrase "power corrupts" is generally attributed to Lord Acton, but is, of
course, a commonplace observation:
Lord Acton has acquired a reputation for oracular wisdom for his trite
observation, in a letter to Bishop Creighton, in 1887, that power corrupts and
absolute power corrupts absolutely. From the reverential care always taken to
ascribe this sentiment to Acton ("as Lord Acton said") one would assume that
by some miracle it had hitherto escaped the observation of mankind.
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observed in Federalist51, is giving the government enough power
"to control the governed," while forcing the government "to
control itself."3 ° One solution, worked out in some detail in the
U.S. Constitution, is the system of checks and balances. The
separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches is made self-enforcing by giving the officers in each
branch constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments by the others. Individual psychology is made to
serve public purposes. As Madison said: "Ambition must be
made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place." 3 As applied
to the judiciary, the principle has meant linking personal esteem
and professional reputation to the successful performance of
official duties, among them, making decisions concerning the
correct roles of the other branches. In the decision of individual
cases, the judges sometimes express their own power by limiting
the power of the government. In the common law tradition of
England and America, strong judges, drawn from successful
practitioners and politicians, have served at once their personal
ambition for recognition, the needs of the judicial branch, and the
Rule of Law.
II. The Reality of the Rule of Law
The law in action, as has often been observed, is not the same
as the law in books. Legal systems, even those supposedly wellgrounded in the Rule of Law, occasionally break down, sometimes
spectacularly. For example, Judge Jeffreys, notorious for his
conduct of the "Bloody Assizes" in England in 1685, became the
personification of the unjust judge and Star Chamber became
synonymous with institutionalized tyranny.32 Corruption also
BERGEN EVANS, DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS xiii (1968).
30 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison)

(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,

1961).
31 Id.

32 George Jeffreys (1648-89), was chief justice of the King's Bench from 1683 to
1685 and Lord Chancellor from 1685 to 1689. See WALKER, supra note 20, at 661. He
has been characterized as "the worst judge that ever disgraced Westminster Hall," and
"he was notorious for bullying, invective, coarse and overbearing conduct." Id. He
presided at the so-called "Bloody Assizes" of 1685, described as "exemplars of
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threatens every legal system. In the 1960s, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court was shaken by the revelation of criminal acts by no
less than three of its justices.33
Not only do legal systems sometimes fail to measure up to the
requirements of the Rule of Law, they also sometimes tolerate,
even for long periods of time, rules and practices that hardly
comport with the ideal. For centuries, the common law refused to
allow criminal defendants to be represented by counsel, a rule
changed in America (at least with respect to federal prosecutions)
by the Sixth Amendment.3 4 For centuries, too, the common law
denied aliens the right to inherit land, a rule that survived the
American Revolution and was only slowly eliminated from the
laws of the states. 35 At the present time, the so-called Diplock
courts in Northern Ireland operate with a single judge and no jury,
a practice justified by a "state of emergency" that has now lasted
over twenty-five years. 36
Despite persistent lapses, the Rule of Law as an ideal has
commanded near universal support; the very generality with which
it is usually stated has made it a convenient rallying cry. The Rule
of Law itself, however, has not been completely immune from
criticism, even from within the legal academy, as a bizarre
The late E.P.
exchange twenty years ago demonstrates.
Thompson, Marxist historian and anti-nuclear protester, concluded
injustice." Id.
Star Chamber was an English court of extraordinary jurisdiction that at first was
used to handle especially difficult cases, but later was abused by the government. It
became "a synonym for a tribunal of arbitrary tyranny." Id. at 1174.
3 See Johnson v. Johnson, 424 P.2d 414, 416 (Okla. 1967) (describing bribetaking of Justice Nelson S. Corn and two other justices).
34 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

35 See 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 53-54

(O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 12th ed., Little, Brown, and Co. 1873) (describing as a "well settled rule of the
common law" that "an alien cannot acquire a title to real property by descent"). Today a
few states have statutes that prohibit inheritance by a nonresident alien if a United States
citizen could not inherit under the law of the alien's country. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 64-3 (1997). Doubts have been expressed about the constitutionality of such statutes.
See PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 28 (2d ed.
1994).
36 See generally JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK
TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM

(1995).
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a book on eighteenth-century English legal history with an
impressive tribute to the Rule of Law, which he proclaimed "an
unqualified human good."37 Reviewing Thompson's book in the
pages of the Yale Law Journal, Harvard Law School Professor
Morton J. Horwitz, a leader of the critical legal studies movement,
attacked Thompson for praising the Rule of Law: "By promoting
procedural justice it enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the
wealthy to manipulate its forms to their own advantage. And it
ratifies and legitimates an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic
conception of human relations."" More recently "critical race
theorists," on the faculty of almost every major American law
school, have questioned whether the Rule of Law is possible when
different races are involved."
Radical critique of the Rule of Law is not new; it has been a
persistent, if minor, theme of the Western moral tradition. Adam
Ferguson, product of the Scottish Enlightenment, made the
trenchant observation in 1773 that "many of the establishments
which serve to defend the weak from oppression, contribute, by
securing the possession of property, to favor its unequal division,
and to increase the ascendant of those from whom the abuses of
power may be feared." 0°
Legal history can teach humility and assist in the formulation
of realistic expectations for others' adherence to the Rule of Law.
Not only must the concept be clarified, but realistic measures of
success must be established. Also, the product must not be
oversold. The Rule of Law is difficult to maintain in the best of
times. Once established, it can long co-exist with contradictory
practices. For all its unquestionable value, it creates a system that
permits abuse by the well-informed and perpetuates inequality.
Candid acknowledgment of these facts will focus attention on the
37 E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 266 (1975).
38 Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE

L.J. 561, 566 (1977).
39 See Neil A. Lewis, Black Scholars View Society with Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1997, at B9. But see DANIEL A FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL
REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW (1997) (criticizing critical

race theory).
40 ADAM FERGUSON, ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Salzberger ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1773).

151 (Fania Oz-
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real challenge (reduction of the risk of abuse) and on the real
benefits (long-term stability and legitimacy). For the successful
export of the Rule of Law, a policy framework and a specific goal
are recommended. 4 '
III. Policy Framework
1. Be clear. The requirements of the Rule of Law are not easy
to specify with exactness in any particular legal system. 42 As
norms of universal application, they must necessarily be stated in
terms of great generality.
In terms of procedure, certain institutional arrangements are
required: (1) regular availability of tribunals for resolving
disputes; (2) impartial decision-makers; and (3) prompt and
effective implementation of decisions. 43 Around these core
concepts cluster others of almost equal importance, such as
adequate record-keeping, fair trial practices, the publicity of
proceedings, reasoned explanations of results, and the fight of
appeal.
No particular substantive law is generally required, but it is
essential that disputes be decided by reference to known preexisting rules (no retrospective laws). In commercial law, stability
is particularly important so that business planning may go forward
with confidence that the rules will not be abruptly changed. As the
great English judge, Lord Mansfield, observed more than two
centuries ago: "In all mercantile transactions the great object
should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence that a
rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way
or the other."44 In non-commercial cases, more flexibility may be
permitted as equitable concerns may qualify the application of
general rules to particular cases. Even in such cases, however,
41 Pessimism has been expressed towards current programs aimed at exporting the

Rule of Law. See Carothers, supra note 1, at 95.
42 See WALKER, supra note 20, at 1093-94 (describing the Rule of Law as ."a
concept of the utmost importance but having no defined, nor readily definable,
content").
41 Cf. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
143, 145 (1958) (listing open courts, an independent judiciary, and a reasoned
justification for decisions).
4 Vallejo v. Wheeler, 98 Eng. Rep. 1012, 1017 (K.B. 1774).
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reference to known pre-existing norms must be required in order to
permit verification of results.
2. Be resolute. The demand for the Rule of Law, as defined
in general terms, should not be negotiable. At this level of
abstraction, the Rule of Law is not culturally conditioned any more
than scientific procedures, basic business practices or, for that
matter, rules of play in international sports. Nevertheless, in many
instances, the Rule of Law can be shown to connect with local
traditions either in religious legal systems or in historical practices.
The Islamic
sharia and the Confucian magistrate are cases in
45
point.
The Rule of Law is demonstrably in the interest of every
modem nation. While avoidance of legal norms may seem
expedient in the short run, it has insupportable costs in lost
efficiency and legitimacy in the long run. Put crudely, the Rule of
Law is in the enlightened self-interest of ruling elites everywhere.
3. Be realistic.
Adherence to the Rule of Law is
demonstrated by the fair resolution of many, if not most, cases; its
absence is shown by the reverse, not by failure in one or a few
individual cases. No legal system resolves all disputes properly,
and celebrated cases are often poor demonstrations of a system's
integrity, as witness The People v. O.J. Simpson. Losing parties
will often equate their loss with the failure of the Rule of Law.
Even in Britain and the United States with well-founded legal
traditions, the demise of the Rule of Law has been frequently and
loudly proclaimed.46
4. Be patient. The Rule of Law has been a slow growth in the
West. The accumulation of appropriate constitutional norms,
professional cultures, and personal characteristics took time.
There is no reason to expect that other regions can force these
41 Sharia, Islamic law, differs from Western law in that it is, in theory, based on
divine revelation, but it has inevitably been developed by the interpretations of scholars
and jurists in a manner similar to Western law. See H.A.R. GIBB, MOHAMMEDANISM:
AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 88-106 (2d ed. 1953).

Confucianism, the state religion of pre-Communist China, was based on a
system of ethical precepts for the harmonious management of society. The Confucian
magistrate was to set a moral example for society. See H.G. CREEL, CHINESE THOUGHT
126-28 (1953).
46 See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.

FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAS TSt-TUNG
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developments overnight.
IV. Policy Goal
The Rule of Law depends on judges willing to decide cases in
accordance with principle, despite occasionally incurring official
displeasure, and sometimes at real personal risk. While the
consistency and stability of statutory law and the regular operation
of law enforcement are powerful adjuncts of the Rule of Law, they
are the responsibility of the political branches of government,
which is primarily responsive to their constituents. Little can be
done externally to encourage proper performance except sustained
and sincere efforts to convince the most influential constituent
groups that the Rule of Law is in their material self-interest.
With the judiciary, however, the accountability is at least in
part professional. Foreign lawyers, speaking a different language
and operating in a distinct historical and legal culture, cannot
directly influence outcomes, but they can assist in the development
of indigenous legal culture. Legal officials must be encouraged to
make their decision process as transparent as possible. The judges
must know someone is watching, but the scrutiny must be
principled and fair. Decisions must be examined with respect to
consistency with pre-existing law, adequacy of the factual record,
and correct application of the law to the facts. The judicial
decision-maker must expect criticism for mistakes, but also praise
for correct and heroic decisions. Critics must operate within a
professional culture that values and supports honest opinions, even
(or especially) those with which they disagree.
The American legal community can assist the project by
paying attention to foreign judicial decisions. American law
schools can invite foreign judges to visit and can provide regular
recognition for distinguished judicial performance. American
legal journals presently publish an enormous number of articles
and comments on recent cases, almost all of them decisions of the
U.S. Supreme Court and many of them analyzed in great and
repetitive detail. Consideration of foreign cases will add welcome
diversity. Knowledge of foreign languages and cultures is, of
course, indispensable, so part of the effort must include more
cosmopolitan training of American lawyers, which will have other
benefits in a globalized economy. The American judiciary, at the
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federal and state level, can encourage exchanges with foreign
judges and can engage in candid discussions of decision-making,
including the decision of real or hypothetical cases.
Bar
associations, not only at the national level, can also participate.
Care must obviously be exercised to prevent the appearance of
officious intermeddling. In addition to receiving outside support,
judges who serve the Rule of Law must be heroes in their own
countries.
Foreign accolades cannot substitute for local
recognition.
Encouraging the development of local legal culture is more
important in the long run than improving foreign observation.
Legal culture is not so readily exportable as scientific culture, in
which the medium is the universal language of mathematics and
experiments are reproducible abroad. Law is inevitably more
local. However, the Rule of Law does have some cross-cultural
regularities.
Judicial independence everywhere is not only
institutional, it is also psychological. Not only must the relevant
constitutional arrangements permit it, but the individual judge's
ambition for recognition and advancement must be linked to the
impartial administration of the Rule of Law. The goal must be the
creation of a strong local legal culture that supports and
encourages judicial independence. To paraphrase Madison, the
judges' ambition must be made to counteract the corrupt, selfish,
and short-sighted ambition of other government officials. 47 The
successful export of the Rule of Law means the end of the need for
threats and blandishments; once fully functional, the Rule of Law
is self-perpetuating and self-policing.

47 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.

